The purok system in San Francisco was setup with minimal financial assistance from the municipal government. Each purok were given initial capital build-up (CBU). Purok leaders were not paid as this engagement is purely voluntary basis. The puroks were allowed to collect regular monthly contribution from their members and impose fines for non-attendance at activities or for violation of their own rules. The money collected was used for their “sinking fund” or operational funds to purchase office supplies needed for their meetings and any administrative costs incurred (mostly office supplies). The CBU was also used as the initial seed money for microfinance, which can be accessed by purok members in case of emergency situations (Matthies 2017) (KDI, 2019, p.6). While economic loss amounted to PhP117.08 million,including agricultural livelihood loss amounting to PhP16.64 million, and recorded damages included 1,022 houses, 17 school buidings, two rural health units, and four government building, there was zero casualty recorded due to Typhoon Haiyan.

The [NDRRM] law also mandated the creation of a permanent Municipal Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Office (MDRRMO), and the creation of DRRMCs down to the barangay level. Because puroks in San Francisco operate as “little barangays” the purok constituted a Committee on DRRM for themselves. In order to avoid adding another layer of bureaucracy, the Committee was to be headed by the Purok Vice President, which meant that the DRRM Committee became in a way, an umbrella committee primus inter pares. However, adhering to the mandates of the new law was difficult. The implementing rules and regulations drafted by the national government basically told local governments what to do in order to comply with the new law, but did not necessarily prepare officials on how to implement them. The MDRRMO had to be created from scratch, according to Rosalinda Serion, former Municipal Social Welfare Officer, prior head of relief operations under the old Municipal Disaster Coordinating Council and who was tapped as the head of the MDRRMO (R. Serion, personal communication 2017). Monica Tan, the MDRRMO Policy and Research Officer, was in charge of documentation and record keeping. Both the Mayor’s Office and the Municipal Council were generally supportive to the young MDRRMO, ensuring the smooth release of funds and hiring of new staff, who were recruited from other municipal offices or those who were involved in previous projects with civil society. San Francisco also began to draft its Five-Year Local DRRM Plan, which integrated not only DRRM and climate change adaptation but also solid waste management and community development programs. What made the transition less difficult was that a number of requirements in the new law were already in place through the DRRM project with Plan International- Philippines. It was only a matter of tweaking certain jargon or complying with reporting and disclosure matters (R. Serion & M. Tan, personal communication 2017). The MDRRMO trained both barangays and purok about DRRM activities, in accordance with the legal mandate. The series of external developments—from using civil society networks to the passage of national legislation—provided the opportunities that allowed San Francisco to transform its purok system as a working community-based DRRM structure. (KDI 2019, p.8)

The purok system has been established before the passage of the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act in 2010. It was first used to address the solid waste management problem of the municipality which later on evolved to providing services on nutrition and livelihood. However, setting up the purok system came with difficulties since there was no compensation involved for the low-income earners. Taking time off from their usual work to do purok activities was seen as a waste of time and a source of conflict, due to misperceptions that purok leaders were getting special favors from the municipal government. There was also disagreement and resistance among elected barangay officials, especially those who belonged to different political groupings than the mayor. In the Philippines, barangays are themselves smaller units of government that may exercise some level of autonomy. For some of these officials, the purok system was viewed as a redundancy.(KDI, 2019, pp.3-4). It took two to three years to revitalize the purok system in 2004. It started with three pilot puroks before it was expanded to all 15 barangays. The first five years proved crucial in communicating, establishing trust, and building relationships with the communities. Once contact was made with residents, there was constant follow through. (KDI, 2019, p.10). The purok system, it appears, works in a context where people might be aware of their environment, but know how to switch out of a default mode of comparing a warning to their current experience. In the case of Poblacion, the dissemination model prevails, but the participants can not imagine the possible effects of a storm in their context. The communication flow might have been supported by training and proactivity on the barangay officials’ front, but it was disabled by the citizens still waiting for something to happen before they took action (Ponce de Leon, 2021).

This adaptation option does not have direct environmental impact as it involves organizing the community.